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SECTION 8(a) (3) OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT; A RATIONALE:
PART I. DISCRIMINATION
Benjamin M. Shieber*
INTRODUCTION

Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that it is
"an unfair labor practice for an employer ... by discrimina-

tion in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .... 1

Authoritative statements by Congress and the Supreme
Court identify the elements of a violation of this section. The
final House Report on the Wagner Act, commenting on the
above language, states:
"Nothing in this subsection prohibits [sic, permits?] interference with the normal exercise of the right of employers to
select their employees or to discharge them. All that is intended is that the employer shall not by discriminatory treatment in hire or tenure of employment or terms or conditions
of employment, interfere with the exercise by employees of
their right to organize and choose representatives. It is for
this reason that the employer is prohibited from encouraging
or discouraging membership in any labor organization by
'
such discrimination.'2
And in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,3 a leading case, the
Supreme Court said:
"The language of § 8 (a) (3) is not ambiguous. The unfair
labor practice is for an employer to encourage or discourage
membership by means of discrimination. Thus this section
does not outlaw all encouragement or discouragement of membership in labor organizations; only such as is accomplished
*Professor of Law, L.S.U. Law School. The author thanks Mr. Shelby Moore,
a third-year student at L:S.U. Law School, for his assistance in the preparation
of this article.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
2. Emphasis added. See H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1934),
reprinted in 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT 3069 (1935) [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST.].
3. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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by discrimination is prohibited. Nor does this section outlaw discrimination in employment as such; only such discrimination as encourages or discourages membership in a
'4
labor organization is proscribed."

While these statements make it clear that two constituent
elements of a Section 8(a) (3) unfair labor practice are discrimination and encouragement or discouragement of membership in a labor organization, other important questions about
that section remain unresolved. These unresolved questions arise
from uncertainty about the meaning of "discrimination" and
confusion about the significance of employer motive. Thus, some
of the following questions have not yet been authoritatively
answered, and the answers to others give undue emphasis to
considerations extraneous to the achievement of the purposes
of the Act. Does "discrimination" occur when a employer's treatment of its employees is caused by something other than employee exercise of rights protected under the Act? Can there be
"discrimination" when an employer treats all employees alike?
When the Board and the courts speak of employer motive, are
they referring to the events which caused the employer to
discharge an employee or act in some other way with respect
to its employees; or to the employer's state of mind, his proor anti-union animus; or to both? Notwithstanding the quoted
statement from the Radio Officers' case, is an employer's proor anti-union animus an additional element of a Section 8 (a) (3)
unfair labor practice? If so, under what circumstances is it an
element of a Section 8(a) (3) violation? Are cases that hold that
Section 8(a) (3) is not violated despite the concurrence of discrimination, discouragement of union membership, and antiunion animus explicable in terms of the current or another rationale of Section 8 (a) (3) ?
This uncertainty and confusion is of consequence because of
the importance of Section 8(a) (3) to protection of employee
rights under the Act. Congress considered that section essential
to give "practical meaning" to the rights of employees "to be
free from employer interference in self-organization or to join
or refrain from joining a labor organization."6 And Section
8(a) (3) still plays a vital role in protecting those rights.
4. Id. at 42-43; accord, Teamsters, Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667,
674-75 (1961).
5. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S.
263 (1965) ; Motor Repair, Inc., 168 NLRB No. 148 (1968).
6. S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST.2311.
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"Violations of Sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) are, despite
33 years of industrial experience with [the] law, still the
largest single source of all unfair labor practices, and over
the years the percentage of such cases has not changed radically. In Fiscal Year 1967, for example, two out of three
charges filed against employers-totaling 7,463 chargesalleged discrimination or discharge in violation of the Act.
Slightly less than one out of three charges filed against
'7
unions-totaling 1,681-alleged such violations.
For this reason, this article dealing with "discrimination,"
and a succeeding one on employer motive, attempt to contribute
to clarification of Section 8(a) (3).
The Meaning of "Discrimination"
Neither the Act itself nor its legislative history contains a
definition of "discrimination," and the Supreme Court has yet
to define that word for the purposes of delineating the unfair
labor practice set forth by Section 8 (a) (3). The inexistence of an
authoritative definition has resulted in Congress, the courts, and
the National Labor Relations Board ascribing various meanings
to "discrimination." Thus, the word sometimes has been used to
refer simply to any employer adverse treatment of employees,
whether or not caused by employee exercise of rights protected
under Section 7 of the Act; sometimes, although not limited
to employer treatment caused by employee exercise of Section
7 rights, it has been limited to employer treatment of employees
that is differential, or that is based on arbitrary reasons on the
part of the employer, or that is imposed by the employer in a
context of employee exercise of Section 7 rights. And, in other
cases, "discrimination" is taken to mean only employer treatment of employees that is caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
At two points in the Act, it seems clear that Congress used
"discriminate" and "discrimination" to refer to nothing more
than employer adverse treatment of employees. Thus, Section
8 (a) (4) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under
this subchapter. . ...
- Here, "discharge," one form of adverse
treatment of employees, is subsumed under "discriminate,," which
7. Address by NLRB Chairman Frank W. McCulloch, N.Y.U. 21st Annual
Conference on Labor, May 14, 1968, in 68 LAn. REL. REP. 60, 63 (1968).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1964) (emphasis added).
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is apparently used as a generic term for all forms of adverse
treatment of employees. And, in the last proviso to Section
8(a) (3), "That no employer shall justify any discrimination
against an employee for non-membership in a labor organization," "discrimination," also appears to be a generic term for all
forms of adverse treatment of employees.9
But, at these two points in the Act, Congress qualified the
words "discriminate" and "discrimination" by stating the circumstances under which employers' acts of discrimination are
to fall within the scope of the statutory language. In these two
situations, the Act expressly provides that the discrimination
is only to come within the statutory language when it is visited
upon an employee for one of the stated reasons, that he "filed
charges or [gave] testimony under this Act" or that he was
not a member of a labor organization. No such qualification is
found in the use of the word "discrimination" to denote a Section 8(a) (3) unfair labor practice. Here, the statute speaks
only of "discrimination... to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" and does not expressly limit the
circumstances under which the discrimination is to come within
the scope of the statutory language. Does the word as used
without such qualification also mean nothing more than adverse
treatment of employees? If it does, then any employer adverse
treatment of employees, including treatment that was not caused
by employee exercise of Section 7 rights, would be "discrimination" for the purposes of Section 8(a) (3). Or, must the cause
of employer adverse treatment of employees be employee exercise of Section 7 rights in order to find that an employer engaged in Section 8(a) (3) "discrimination"? The courts and the
Board have made statements supporting different answers to
this question.
In some cases, "discrimination" is used to mean employer
adverse treatment of employees that need not be caused by
employee exercise of Section 7 rights. At one point in the Radio
Officers' case, the Supreme Court seems to have used the word
in this sense. The Court said:
"In past cases, we have been called upon to clarify the
terms 'discrimination' and 'membership in any labor organization.' Discrimination is not contested in these cases:
involuntary reduction of seniority, refusal to hire for an avail9. Id. § 158(a)(3)

(emphasis added).
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able job, and disparate wage treatment are clearly discriminatory...."-lo
thus equating "discrimination" with any adverse treatment of
employees.
Other expressions support the view that "discrimination"
includes employer adverse treatment of employees that need
not be caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights. But in
these cases employer adverse treatment of employees standing
alone is not considered sufficient to support a finding of Section
8(a) (3) "discrimination." Additional requirements, that the
treatment of employees be differential; or that it be caused by
arbitrary reasons on the part of the employer; or that, though
not caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights, it be imposed by the employer in a context of employee exercise of Section 7 rights, are considered necessary. For example, Mr. Justice
Clark required differential employer treatment of employees in
his dissent in the Teamsters, Local 357 case when he said,
"[T]he plain and accepted meaning of the word 'discrimination' supports my interpretation. In common parlance, the word means to distinguish or differentiate. Without good reason, we should not limit the word to mean to
distinguish in a particular manner (i.e., on the basis of
union membership or activity) so that a finding that the
hall dispatched employees without regard to union membership or activity bars a finding of violation.
"Given that interpretation of the word 'discrimination', it
becomes necessary to determine the class of employee involved, and then whether any differences in treatment within
that class are present .... 11
And Judge Friendly, dissenting in the Miranda Fuel case, 12 accepted Mr. Justice Clark's requirement and added a second,
saying:
"Although 'In common parlance, the word [to discriminate] means to distinguish or differentiate,' 365 U.S. at 689
(dissenting opinion), it more often means, both in common
and particularly in legal parlance, to distinguish or differentiate without sufficient reason.... A teacher thus does
not 'discriminate' simply by failing a student in an examina10. 347 U.S. 17, 39 (1954).
11. 365 U.S. 689-90 (1961) ; NLRB v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc.. 398
F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1968).
12. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
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tion, although he would by doing so against his own judg'
ment at outside dictation.

13

And, two cases cited with approval by the Supreme Court in
Radio Officers' required that the employer adverse treatment
of employees be imposed in a context of employee exercise of
Section 7 rights. 1 4 In one, Cusano v. NLRB, the court of appeals
said:
"Petitioner urges as an alternative argument that whether
or not a discharged employee actually makes a false statement is irrelevant so long as the employer reasonably believes he did and so long as the employer actually discharges
the employee on the strength of that belief. It is true that
an employer may discharge an employee for a good reason,
a bad reason, or no reason at all.... This rule, however, is
necessarily limited where an employee is engaging in activities protected by the Act.... We conclude that if the conduct giving rise to the employer's mistaken belief is itself
protected activity, then the employer's erroneous observations cannot justify the discharge.'

15

On the other hand, some authorities reject the view that "discrimination" for purposes of Section 8(a) (3) includes employer adverse treatment of employees caused by reasons other
than employee exercise of Section 7 rights. They hold that only
treatment caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights is
"discrimination." Some of these authorities add as a requirement that the employer differentiate among its employees in its
treatment of them. Others hold that differential employer treatment of employees is not necessary; discrimination is shown even
if the employer treats all employees alike so long as the treatment is caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
In Teamsters, Local 357, the majority indicated that they
understood "discrimination" as used in Section 8(a) (3) to require both that the employer adverse treatment of employees be:
caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights and that it be
differential treatment. Mr. Justice Douglas reasoned that a.
union secured discharge of an employee caused by his failure:
to use a union hiring hall was not "discrimination" because (1)
13.
14.
Cusano
15.

Id. at 181.
See NLRB v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1953);:
v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951), cited 347 U.S. 17, 45 n.53 (1954).
190 F.2d 898, 902-03 (3d Cir. 1951).

.
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the hiring hall agreement did not provide for differential treatment of employees on the basis of their union activities and (2)
neither ,the. employer nor the union differentiated between the
discharged employee and other employees on the basis of union
activities. He said,
. "But surely discrimination cannot be inferred from the
face of the instrument when the instrument specifically provides that there will be no discrimination against 'casual employees' because of the presence or absence of union membership. The only complaint in the case was by Slater, a union
member, who sought to circumvent the hiring-hall agreement. When an employer and the union enforce the agreement against union members, we cannot say without more
that either indulges in the kind of discrimination to which
the Act is addressed. ,16
And, in a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan also indicated that "discrimination" requires differentiation between
employees. This appears from his statement that "the Act is
not intended to interfere significantly with those activities of
employer and union which are justified by nondiscriminatory
business purposes, or by nondiscriminatory attempts to benefit
all the represented employees. ' 17 Also, Mr. Justice Harlan's
quotations from the legislative history, in which he emphasizes
words like "merely," "solely," and "only," appear to be directed
at'showing that Congress was concerned with cases in which employers differentiated among their employees on the basis of the
employees' involvement in Section 7 activities.' 8
The contrary position, that differential employer treatment
of employees is not necessary for a finding of Section 8(a) (3)
16. 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961).
17. Id. at 682.
:18. Id. at 682-83. Additional authorities that indicate that differential treatment is required are: Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 61 (dissenting
opinion) (1954) ; Botany Worsted Mills, 4 NLRB 292, 300 (1937) ("Discrimination involves an intent to distinguish in treatment of employees on the basis of
union affiliations or activities, thereby encouraging or discouraging membership in
a labor organization, and it is immaterial whether this be done by means of discriminatory company rules, or in the discriminatory application of non-discriminatory rules, or in the absence of any rule.") ; Comment, Discrimination and
the NLRB: The Scope of Board Power under Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2), 32
U. OF Cm. L. Rav. .124, 126-27 (1964) (" 'Discrimination,' as used in section
8(a) (3), might reasonably have three meanings: (1) any differentiation or distinction; (2) any invidious distinction or differentiation based upon or motivated
.by union :relationships; (3) differentiation or distinction without sufficient reason, a meaning .commonly conveyed by use of the adjectives 'arbitrary' or 'invidious.' ")
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"discrimination," is the teaching of the Republic Aviation case. 19
That case established that "discrimination" is any employer adverse treatment of employees with respect to employment conditions caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights, 2 0 even
though the employer does not differentiate between employees
on the basis of employee exercise of Section 7 rights. In Republic
Aviation, the Court set forth and then rejected the employer's
argument that "discrimination" required a showing that different employer treatment was accorded employees who had engaged in Section 7 activities than was accorded employees who
had engaged in similar activities which were unrelated to Section 7. It said,
"In the Republic Aviation case, petitioner urges that
irrespective of the validity of the rule against solicitation,
its application in this instance did not violate section 8 (3) ...
because the rule was not discriminatorily applied against
union solicitation but was impartially enforced against all
solicitors. It seems clear, however, that if a rule against solicitation is invalid as to union solicitation on the employer's
premises during the employees' own time, a discharge because of violation of that rule discriminates within the meaning of section 8(3) 2 in
that it discourages membership in a
1
labor organization."

'

These different definitions of "discrimination" testify to the
uncertainty about the meaning of that word for purposes of
finding an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (3) of the
Act. That uncertainty is plainly exhibited in the opinion of Mr.
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in American Shipbuilding
Co. v. NLRB." While indicating that discrimination requires differential treatment of employees by reason of the exercise by
19. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
20. Employer favorable treatment of employees with respect to employment
conditions caused by employee exercise of section 7 rights would also be "discrimination." See S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 2 LFo. HIsr. 2310-11;
of. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964). Because analysis
of the meaning of "discrimination" is not affected by whether the employer
treatment of employees is adverse or favorable and relatively few cases involve
favorable treatment, this article generally speaks of employer adverse treatment.
21. 324 U.S. 794, 805 (1945). In the Republic Aviation case the court speaks
of Section 8(3). From the date of the original enactment of the National Labor
Relations Act by the 1935 Wagner Act to the date of enactment of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, the language
denoting the employer unfair labor practice now found in § 8(a) (3) appeared in
§ 8(3) of the Act. The 1947 Act did not make any change in this language. See
49 Stat. 452 (74th Cong., 1st Sess.) and 61 Stat. 140 (80th Cong., 1st Sess.).
22. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
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employees of Section 7 rights, the opinion equated discrimination
with discouragement of union membership. The Court said:
"As this case well shows, use of the lockout does not carry
with it any necessary implication that the employer acted to
discourage union membership or otherwise discriminate
against union members as such. The purpose and effect of
the lockout were only to bring pressure upon the union to
modify its demands. Similarly, it does not appear that the
natural tendency of the lockout is severely to discourage
union membership while serving no significant employer interest. In fact, it is difficult to understand what tendency
to discourage union membership or otherwise discriminate
against union members was perceived by the Board. There
is no claim that the employer locked out only union members,
or locked out any employee simply because he was a union
conditioned
member; nor is it alleged that the employer
'
rehiring upon resignation from the union."23
In this opinion, the existing uncertainty about the meaning of
"discrimination" appears to have resulted in confusing and
merging two distinct elements of a Section 8 (a) (3) unfair labor
practice, discrimination and discouragement of union membership, into one. Any effort to alleviate this uncertainty and avoid
further confusion requires that we first establish the meaning
of "discrimination" as used to define a Section 8(a) (3) unfair
labor practice. As an introduction to that effort, it seems useful
to state the position taken herein.
. I believe that "discrimination" is any change by an employer
of the employment conditions of its employees caused by the
exercise by employees of rights protected under Section 7 of the
Act. And my view is that differential employer treatment of
employees because of their exercise of Section 7 rights is not
required for a finding of "discrimination." I submit that this
definition of "discrimination" is supported by both legislative
intent and the decided cases. Furthermore, "discrimination," so
defined, contributes to making Section 8 (a) (3) an instrument
for achieving its intended policy objectives and frees its implementation from considerations that are irrelevant to the
achievement of those objectives.
The most important question about the meaning of "discrimination" is whether a finding of Section 8(a) (3) "discrim23. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
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ination" can be made when the cause of an employer's treatment of its employees was something other than employee exercise of Section 7 rights. The answer to this question will not
only determine the breadth of Section 8 (a) (3) but, as will be
shown in the following article, it will also serve to clarify the
significance of employer motive in cases arising under that section. The Court has yet to give an authoritative answer to this
important question. For while the Court recently stated that
"discrimination in its simplest form" is employer treatment of
employees caused by the fact that employees "engaged in protected concerted activity," i.e., exercised their Section 7 rights,
it has never explicitly rejected the possibility that more complex forms of "discrimination" may include employer treatment
of employees caused by something other than employee exercise
of Section 7 rights. 4 I believe that rejection of that possibility
is warranted by the legislative history of Section 8(a) (3), the
weight of the decided cases, and the goal of better achieving the
policy objectives of the Act.
The difficulty involved in arriving at the correct definition
of "discrimination" is increased by the fact that the question
whether "discrimination" includes employer treatment of employees caused by something other than employee exercise of
Section 7 rights was not dealt with explicitly in the legislative
history. For although the legislative history of Section 8(a) (3)
makes it clear that Congress intended to limit the scope of the
prohibitions of that section to employer treatment of employees
that interfered with employee exercise of Section 7 rights, this
does not entail the conclusion that Congress undertook to achieve
this limitation on the scope of Section 8(a) (3) by limiting "discrimination" to employer treatment of employees caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights. 25 As it did in Section 8 (a) (4),

Congress may simply have used "discrimination" in Section
8 (a) (3) to mean any employer treatment of employees whether
or not caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights. And Congress may have achieved the desired limitation on the prohibitions of Section 8 (a) (3) by the requirement that such employer
treatment of employees "encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization." This is the view adopted by Justices
Clark and Whittaker in their dissent in the Teamsters, Local
357 case:
24. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 32 (1967).
25. But cf. Comment, Disorimination and the NLRB, 32 U. or CHi. L. Rm.
124, 136-40 (1964).
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"The word 'discrimination' in the section [8(a) (3)], as
the Board points out and I agree, includes not only distinctions contingent upon 'the presence or absence of union
membership,' ante, p. 675, but all differences in treatment
regardless of their basis. This is the 'cause' portion of the
section. But § 8 (a) (3) also includes an 'effect' clause which
provides that the intended or inherent effect of the discrimination must be 'to encourage or discourage [union]
membership.' The section has, therefore, a divided structure.
Not all discriminations violate the section, but only those
the effect of which is encouragement or discouragement of
union membership. Cf. Radio Officers v. Labor Board, 347
U.S. 17, at 43.... Each being a requirement of the section,
both must be present before an unfair labor practice
"26
exists ....

While not conclusive, the legislative history of Section
8 (a) (3) supports the contrary view: that by "discrimination" as
used to define the unfair labor practice of Section 8 (a) (3) Congress meant only employer treatment of employees that was
caused by the exercise of Section 7 rights by employees. First,
the fact that Congress considered the language of Section
8(a) (3) as enumerating "specific practices" and "spelling out
with particularity" the "general provisions" of subsection
8(a) (1) militates against defining "discrimination" as used in
Section 8(a) (3) as nothing more than adverse employer treatment of employees whether or not caused by employee exercise
of Section 7 rights. Section 8(a) (1) provides that it shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7," and one of the rights specified in Section 7 is "the right.., to form, join, or assist labor organizations. ' 2 7 If "discrimination" as used in the Section 8(a) (3)
clause making it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by
discrimination.., to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization12 meant simply employer treatment of employees without being limited to treatment caused by employee
exercise of Section 7 rights, Congress would appear to have
duplicated rather than "spelled out with particularity" the provisions of Section 8(a) (1).
There is also evidence that Congress distinguished between
26. 365 U.S. 667, 688-89 (1961).
27. See 49 Stat. 452 (74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935).
28. Id.
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employer treatment of employees caused by employee exercise
of Section 7 rights and treatment caused by other reasons, and
that it understood that only the former was "discrimination"
for the purposes of Section 8(a) (3). In its discussion of Section 8(a) (3), the Senate Report on the Wagner Act states:
"Of course nothing in the bill prevents an employer from
discharging a man for incompetence; from advancing him
for special aptitude; or from demoting him for failure to
perform. But if the right to be free from employer interference in self organization or to join or refrain from joining
a labor organization is to have any practical meaning, it must
be accompanied by assurance that its exercise will not result
in discriminatory treatment or loss of the opportunity for
2 9
work."

Both of the above sentences suggest that Congress was assuming that the enumerated employer acts satisfied the encouragement or discouragement of membership element of Section 8 (a) (3), and therefore that it was focusing its attention
on the discrimination element. If it were otherwise, if there were
no assumption of encouragement or discouragement of membership, there would be no reason to distinguish the situations
described in the first sentence from those of the second. For,
only if it is assumed that the acts of discharge for incompetence or demotion for failure to perform mentioned in the first
quoted sentence discouraged membership, can there be any possible basis for believing that they might, like the circumstances
mentioned in the second sentence, constitute a violation of Section 8(a) (3). Thus, while assuming that, under the circumstances enumerated in both sentences, the employer's actions
discouraged membership in a labor organization, Congress stated
that it was not an unfair labor practice under Section 8 (a) (3)
when a discharge or demotion was caused by incompetence or
failure to perform, but that it was an unfair labor practice under
that section when loss of the opportunity for work was caused
by employee exercise of the Section 7 right to join a labor organization. Since in both sentences discouragement of membership was assumed, the statement that the circumstances presented in the first sentence did not constitute an unfair labor
practice must have been based on the inexistence of "discrimination," while the indication that the circumstances presented in
29. S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 2 LEG.
(emphasis added).

HIST.

2310-11 (1935)
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the second sentence did constitute an unfair labor practice must
have been due to the fact that these circumstances did constitute "discrimination." Hence, when the employer adverse treatment was caused by incompetence or failure to perform, which
are reasons other than employee exercise of a Section 7 right,
Congress indicated that there was no "discrimination." But
when the employer adverse treatment was caused by an employee's joining a labor organization, the exercise of a Section
7 right, Congress indicated that "discrimination" was present.
The quoted paragraph therefore suggests that Congress understood that the line between employer treatment of employees
which would constitute "discrimination" and that which would
not was to be drawn on the basis of whether the cause of the
employer treatment of its employees was employee exercise of
Section 7 rights.
There is, in addition, evidence that Congress did not consider
even adverse employer treatment of employees based on arbitrary reasons on the part of the employer to be "discrimination." The discussion of Section 8 (3) in the House Report on the
Wagner Act, submitted after the above discussed Senate Report,30
stated:
"Nothing in this subsection prohibits [sic, permits?] interference with the normal exercise of the right of employers
to select their employees or to discharge them. All that is intended is that the employer shall not by discriminatorytreatment in hire or tenure of employment or terms or conditions of employment, interfere with the exercise by employees of their right to organize and choose representatives.
It is for this reason that the employer is prohibited from encouraging or discouraging membership in any labor organization by such discrimination."'"
This statement expands the permissible reasons for possible
employer adverse treatment of employees from the few specifics mentioned in the Senate Report to whatever reasons were
then permissible under the "normal exercise of the right of employers to select their employees or to discharge them." These
included then, as now, purely arbitrary grounds.3 2 And, in the
30. S. Rep. No. 573 was submitted on May 1, 1935, and H.R. Rep. No. 1147
was submitted on June 10, 1935.
31. H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, 2 LEG. HIST. 3069 (1935)
(emphasis added).
32. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom, 67 COLUm. L.
REv. 1404 (1967).
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Report, the "normal exercise of the right of employers," including adverse treatment based on arbitrary reasons, is then
contrasted with "discriminatory treatment" and "such discrimination." This contrast indicates that Congress did not understand "discrimination" to include employer treatment of employees that was within "the normal exercise of the right of
employers.., to discharge," including discharge for arbitrary
reasons. But, if discharge for even arbitrary reasons on an employer's part was not considered "discrimination" for purposes
of Section 8(a) (3), then what was? It is, I think, reasonable
to answer: only discharge and other employer treatment of employees caused by "the exercise by employees of their right to
organize and choose representatives," i.e., employee exercise of
Section 7 rights. The conclusion is, therefore, that Congress intended "discrimination" as used in Section 8(a) (3) to refer
only to employer treatment of employees that is caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
This conclusion is in accord with the court and Board decisions involving Section 8(a) (3). Except for a few cases, the
continuing authority of which is questionable, the Board and the
courts have not held employer action violative of Section 8 (a) (3)
unless the cause of the employer treatment of employees was
employee exercise of Section 7 rights.38
At times, there have been explicit statements that "discrimination" for purposes of Section 8 (a) (3) is employer treatment of employees caused by employee exercise of Section 7
rights. Thus, in an early case the Board said:
33. See, e.g., cases discussed in 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 65-88 (1939). In this
report, the Board said: "The Board has never held it to be an unfair labor practice
for an employer to hire or discharge, to promote or demote, to transfer, lay off,
or reinstate, or otherwise to affect the hire or tenure of employees or their terms or
conditions of employment, for asserted reasons of business, animosity, or because
of sheer caprice, so long as the employer's conduct is not wholly or in part
motivated by antiunion cause." Id. at 65. See also cases cited in Ward, Proof
of "Discrimination" under the National Labor Relations Act, 7 GEo. WAsH. L.
REV. 797 (1939), and Ward, Discrimination Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1152, 1187-1192 (1939).
i Even in those cases in which the Court states that the conduct involved
"is so 'inherently destructive of employee interests' that it may be deemed proscribed without need for proof of an underlying improper motive" (See NLRB
v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967), the cause of the adverse
employer treatment of employees has been employee exercise of section 7 rights.
In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), one of the cases in this
category, the cause of the employer adverse treatment of its employees (the grant
of super-seniority to other employees) was their exercise of the section 7 right
to strike. In another case in this category, Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793 (1945), the cause of the employer adverse treatment of the employee (discharge of the employee) was his exercise of the section 7 right to
solicit other employees to become union members.
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"Discrimination involves an intent to distinguish in treatment of employees on the basis of union affiliations or activities, thereby encouraging or discouraging membership in
a labor organization .... -34
And a court of appeals made a similar statement in analyzing
the elements of a Section 8 (a) (3) violation. That court said:
"When a charge is made that by firing an employee the
employer has exceeded the lawful limits of his right to manage and to discipline, substantial evidence must be adduced
to support at least three points. First, it must be shown that
the employer knew that the employee was engaging in some
activity protected by the Act. Second, it must be shown that
the employee was discharged because he had engaged in a
protected activity. NLRB v. Reynolds International Pen Co.,
162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947) ; NLRB v. Citizens News Co.,
134 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Interlake Iron Corp. v. NLRB,
131 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1942). Third, it must be shown that
the discharge had the effect of encouraging or discouraging
membership in a labor organization.... The first and second
points constitute discrimination and the practically automatic
inference as to third point results in a violation of § 8-a-3....
"In order to supply a basis for inferring discrimination,
it is necessary to show that one reason for the discharge is
' 35
that the employee was engaging in protected activity.
Finally, according to Justices Clark and Whittaker, dissenting
in Teamsters, Local 357 v. NLRB,
"[T]he Court agree[d] that there can be no 'discrimination'
within the section unless it is based on union membership,
i.e., members treated one way, nonmembers another, with
further distinctions, among members, based on good standing. . ... 6
34. Botany Worsted Mills, 4 N.L.R.B. 292, 300 (1937). See A. S. Abell
Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 644, 654 (1938), enforced in part, 97 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1938) :
"While we believe Thamert's membership in the Union may have been responsible for the treatment of which he complained, we consider that treatment to
constitute discrimination of so minor a nature as not to warrant a finding that
the respondent discriminated, within the meaning of the Act, in regard to
Thamert's condition of employment."

35. NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F.2d 883, 884-85 (1st Cir. 1953).
Accord, Shattuck Dena Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1966),
Colecraft Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 998, 1004 (2d Cir. 1967) ; 24 NLRB ANN.
REP. 62 (1960).
36. 365 U.S. 667, 689 (1961) (emphasis in original) ; accord, NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) ; NLRB v. Teamsters, Local 294,
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In a few cases, the Board and courts of appeals have held that
employer adverse treatment of employees constituted "discrimination" even though caused by reasons other than the employee's exercise of Section 7 rights, since the treatment occurred in a context of employee exercise of Section 7 rights.3 7 Two
of those cases, Cusano v. NLRB and NLRB v. Industrial Cotton
Mills, were cited with approval by the court in the Radio Officers case.35 In these two cases, after finding that the cause of
the adverse treatment of an employee was the employer's honest
but mistaken belief that he had engaged in misconduct, the Board
held that the employers' actions were unfair labor practices in
violation of both Sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) of the Act. The
courts enforced the Board's orders. They reasoned that, if they
were to hold no unfair labor practice was committed when an
employer's honest but mistaken belief in employee misconduct
resulted in adverse treatment of employees engaged in protected activities, they "would materially weaken the guarantees
of the act for the extent of the employees' protected rights would
be made to vary with the state of the employer's mind." 39
However, in a similar case, a court of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's order on the ground that there was no unfair labor practice unless the cause of the employer's acts was
employee "union activity." The court said:
"[T]here is a fatal defect in the finding of examiner and
board that, even if the employers in good faith believed...
that Rawlins was a brawler, and discharged him in good
faith because they so believed, and not for his union activities,
the discharge could be held discriminatory unless the employer assumed and discharged the burden.., that the belief
was well founded.
"This court, and we think, all other courts have held to the
317 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1963); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132
(1937) : "The act does not compel the petitioner to employ anyone; it does not
require that the petitioner retain in its employ an incompetent editor or one
who fails faithfully to edit the news to reflect the facts without bias or prejudice.
The act permits a discharge for any reason other than union activity or agitation
for collective bargaining with employees ......
37. NLRB v. Cambria Clay Products Co., 215 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1954),
enforcing 106 N.L.R.B. 267 (1953) ; NLRB v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F.2d
87 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954), enforcing 102 N.L.R.B.
1265 (1953); Cusano v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951), enforcing 92
N.L.R.B. 1272 (1951) ; see Meltzer, The Lockout Cases, 1965 SuP. COURT Rv.
87, 113.
38. 347 U.S. 17, 45, n.53 (1954).
39. 190 F.2d 898, 902 (3d Cir. 1951).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

contrary. If anything is settled in labor law and under the
act, we think it is that membership in a union does not
guarantee the member against discharge as such. It affords
protection against discharge only where it is established that
' 40
the discharge is because of union activity.
In none of these cases did the Board or the court of appeals
distinguish between Section 8(a) (1) and Section 8(a) (3).
Either violations of both sections were found or no violation
was found.
The Board and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
followed the same course in the Burnup and Sims case. 41 The
Board held that, when the cause of discharge of two employees
engaged in Section 7 activities was their employer's honest but
mistaken belief that they had threatened to dynamite the plant
if the union that they were supporting was not chosen to represent the employees, the discharge violated Sections 8(a) (1)
and 8(a) (3) of the Act. The court of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's order, finding that the discharge was not
"discrimination discouraging protected activity" and that neither
Section 8(a) (1) nor Section 8(a) (3) had been violated. 42 The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.43 But, in so doing,
the Court cast great doubt on the continued authority for purposes of Section 8(a) (3) of the Cusano and Industrial Cotton
Mills cases, since it expressly refused to consider whether Section 8(a) (3) had been violated and based its decision only on
Section 8(a) (1).4 The Court concluded that it was a violation
of Section 8(a) (1) for an employer to discharge an employee
engaged in activities protected under Section 7 of the Act on the
basis of an honest but mistaken belief of misconduct because
"otherwise the protected activity would lose some of its immunity" since "a protected activity acquires a precarious status
engaging in it
if innocent employees can be discharged while
45
faith.
good
in
acts
employer
the
though
even
The refusal by the Supreme Court to find a Section 8 (a) (3)
unfair labor practice in the Burnup and Sims case, the fact that
Cusano and Industrial Cotton Mills deal with Sections 8(a) (1)
40. See Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc. v. NLRB, 203 F.2d 486, 487-88 (5th
Cir. 1953).
41. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 322 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1963), modifying
and enforcing 137 N.L.R.B. 766 (1962).
42. 322 F.2d 51, 61 (1963).
43. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
44. Id. at 22.
45. Id. at 23.
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and 8(a) (3) indiscriminately without attempting any analysis
of Section 8(a) (3) issues, and the fact that these cases stand
isolated in the great mass of Section 8(a) (3) cases in which
the cause of employer treatment of employees was employee
exercise of Section 7 rights, lead to the conclusion that these
decisions are no longer authoritative insofar as Section 8 (a) (3)
is concerned. Therefore, their holdings can be rejected to the
extent that they are authority for the proposition that "discrimination" for purposes of Section 8(a) (3) may be found although the cause of employer treatment of employees was something other than employee exercise of Section 7 rights when
the employer treatment of employees occurs in a context of employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
In addition to the cases dealing with an employer's honest
but mistaken belief of employee misconduct, another line of cases
has been understood by some as holding that discrimination
within Section 8(a) (3) may occur even though the cause of
the employer treatment of an employee is not employee exercise
of Section 7 rights. These cases involve employer treatment of
employees based on union requests, when the reason for the
union request is not a matter that is normally considered a matter of union concern, but some other reason, such as personal
animosity on the part of a union officer.
As stated by Board members McCulloch and Fanning in their
MirandaFuel case dissent:
"[T]he discrimination which §§ 8(b) (2) and 8(a) (3) outlaws is that related to 'union membership, loyalty, acknowledgment of union authority, or the performance of union
obligations.' -146
In the view of these Board members and those judges who
agree with them, when a union's request to an employer for
adverse treatment of an employee is based on personal animosity
of a union officer or arbitrary grounds, e.g., because the employee is a "troublemaker" and "no good,

' 47

it cannot be said that

there was "discrimination" within Section 8 (a) (3) because the
cause of the union-requested treatment of the employee was not
related to "union membership, loyalty, acknowledgment of union
authority, or the performance of union obligations."
Were this analysis correct, the Board's holding in Miranda
46. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 197 (1962).
47. See NLRB v. Teamsters, Local 294, 317 F.2d 746, 751 (2d Cir. 1963).
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Fuel and other cases would indeed support the view that "discrimination" for the purposes of Section 8(a) (3) may occur
when employer treatment of employees is caused by something
other than employee exercise of Section 7 rights. But the analysis is incorrect. It fails to recognize that whenever an employer
treats an employee adversely with respect to his employment
conditions at the request of a union, that employer treatment
is caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights and is therefore "discrimination" within Section 8(a) (3). Employer treatment of an employee at the request of a union is always related
to "union membership, loyalty, the acknowledgment of union
authority, or the performance of union obligations."
Among the rights of employees protected by Section 7 is the
"right to join unions, [and to] be good, bad, or indifferent members''48 Sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) protect this right. As the
Court, said in the Radio Officers' case:
"The policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from
their organizational rights. Thus §§ 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2)
were designed to allow employees to freely exercise their
right to join unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members,
or abstain from joining any union without imperilling their
livelihood. The only limitation Congress has chosen to impose on this right is specified in the proviso to § 8(a) (3)
which authorizes employers to enter into certain union security contracts ....,,49
Unfortunately, in some unions, "union membership, loyalty,
acknowledgment of union authority, or the performance of
union obligations" requires not only "following the union's
desired hiring practices, ' 50 observing the union's rules with respect to working with persons who are members of a different
craft union, 51 and even abstaining from supporting an opposi52
tion candidate to an incumbent union officer in a union election,
but also the obligation to satisfy the racist policies of the union, 53
the obligation never to have been found guilty of a morally re48. Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
49. Id.
50. See id. at 42; Local 100, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963).
51. See Ironworkers, Local No. 207 v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701, 704 n.2 (1963).
52. See NLRB v. A. & B. Zinman, Inc., 372 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1967).
53. See, e.g., Houston Maritime Assn., Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (1967);
Cargo Handlers, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 321 (1966) ; Jacobson, Union Conservatism:
A Barrier to Racial Equality in THE NEGRO AND THE AMEiCAN LABOR MOVFMENT 17-20 (ed. Jacobson 1968).
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prehensible act, even in the distant past, 54 the obligation not
to have signed the Stockholm peace petition, 55 and recently the
obligation not to unload
shipments of de Gaulle and Mao dolls
56
into the United States.

The Board and the courts have concluded that an employee's
Section 7 right to be a good, bad, or indifferent union member
"without imperilling [his] livelihood" includes the right to observe or disregard a union's strictures with respect to hiring
practices,5 7 working with employees who belong to a different
craft union, 58 joining a strike called in accordance with fair
union procedures,59 and opposing an incumbent union officer for
election to local union office. 69 There is no reason to arrive at
any different conclusion about an employee's decision to observe
or disregard a union's strictures about what race an employee
should be a member of, his politics, or his over-all ability to avoid
impressing one of the officers of his union as a "troublemaker"
who is "no good." These matters, too, are union obligations when
a union has chosen to make them so for the very reason that the
union has chosen to make them so. With respect to these matters,
too, employees have the right under Section 7 to be good, bad,
or indifferent union members "without imperilling their livelihood."
Indeed, there is less justification for allowing a union to induce adverse employer treatment of employees with respect to
their livelihood for arbitrary reasons than there is for allowing
it to affect employees' livelihoods for reasons that are usually
matters of union concern. For while union-induced employer action because of matters that are within the usual area of union
concern may serve societal ends, actions based on arbitrary reasons do not. Thus, while society may derive some benefit from
a union's rules on hiring practices which distribute available
work equitably to all persons attached to an industry,61 or its
rules on joining a strike called in accordance with fair union
54. 97 CONG. REc. 6062 (1951) (remarks of Senator Taft).
55. See statement of George J. Bott, then NLRB Counsel, in HEARiNGs
ON PROPOSED REVISIONS OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIoNs ACT OF 1947
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LAROR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
Cong.,
1st Sess. 2150, n.5 (1953), cited in Sovern, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DisCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ch. 6, n.86 (1966).

83d

56. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1968, at 93, col. 8.
57. See Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Teamsters,
Local 676, 172 N.L.R.B. no 58 (1968).
58. See Ironworkers, Local No. 207 v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963).
59. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
60. :See NLRB v. A. & B. Zinman, Inc., 372 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1967).
61. See, e.g., Teamsters, Local 676, 172 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (1968).
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procedures which may aid in inducing an employer to raise wages
to a prevailing industry level,62 society does not benefit by permitting the racist or political theories that a particular union
may hold to be enforced by means of union-induced employer
treatment of employees.
It is clear that Congress intended that some union-induced
employer treatment of employees with respect to their employrnent conditions should be considered "discrimination" for the
purposes of Section 8(a) (3) when the basis for the union's
request was a matter that usually concerns unions 3 This being
so, there 'is no reason to believe that Congress excluded unioninduced employer treatment of employees with respect to their
employment conditions for reasons of arbitrariness on the part
of the union or its officers, treatment that has no social utility,
from the category of "discrimination," thereby exempting such
union actions from Section 8 (b) (2).
Furthermore, to hold that such Union induced adverse treatment of employees for arbitrary reasons is not "discrimination"
for the purposes of Section 8(a) (3) would greatly weaken the
protection of employees' job rights even in those situations in
which all agree that union-induced employer adverse treatment
of employees is "discrimination." For example, a union officer
intent on 'enforcing a union rule prohibiting work during a
strike would only need to exercise patience and circumspection
to find a permissible arbitrary reason, as distinguished from an
employee's insistence on working during a strike, to insist on the
discharge of the employee some time after the end of the strike.
Surely, Congress did not intent that "8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) ...
designed to allow employees to freely exercise their right to
join unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain
from joining any union without imperilling their livelihood"
should be set at nought whenever a union could prove that its
reason for inducing employer adverse treatment of an employee
64
Awas an arbitrary one.
I therefore conclude that whenever an employer treats an
'employee adversely at a union's behest, Section 8(a) (3) "discrimination," in' accordance with the definition which I believe
to be correct, i.e., employer treatment of employees caused by
employee exercise of Section 7 rights, occurs. In all such cases,
62. See, e.g., NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
63., Se Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40-42 (1954) ; NLRB
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967).
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the cause of the employer adverse treatment:of employees is employee exercise of Section 7 rights, specifically, the right to be a
good, bad, or indifferent union member, since it is the employee's
exercise of this right in a manner unsatisfactory to the union
that causes the union request for employer adverse treatment of
the employee. Accordingly, neither Miranda Fuel5 nor any of
the other cases 66 dealing with union-induced employer adverse
treatment of employees hold that "discrimination" for purposes
of Section 8(a) (3) includes employer treatment of employees
caused by reasons other than employee exercise of Section 7
rights.
In NLRB v. Teamsters, Local 294,67 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit rejected the view that any union-caused
employer treatment of employees constituted "discrimination"
within Section 8 (a) (3). The court indicated that a union does
not violate Section 8(b) (2) unless the employer action which
the union seeks to induce would violate Section 8 (a) (3) if the
8 This is correct.
employer complied with the union's request.6
" [S]ection [8(b) (2)] requires only a showing that the union
caused or attempted to cause the employer to engage in conduct
which, if committed, would violate § 8(a) (3). ' 69 But the court
then altered this accepted interpretation of Section 8(b) (2).
It said:
"The union does not commit an unfair labor practice
merely because it causes or attempts to cause an employer
to promote or demote an employee or to discriminate for or
against him. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953) discrimination in seniority which was adopted at the
behest of the union was found unexceptionable. In Aeronautical etc. v. Campbell, 347 U.S. 521 (1949), the Court
gave its approval to super-seniority for union officials
which was, of course, a practice proposed by the union. Local
357 etc. v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961), held that it was not
an unfair labor practice for a union to cause the discharge
64. A stated "purpose and policy" of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, which added Section 8(b) (2) to the National Labor Relations Act, was "to
protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce.... " 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1947).
65. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
66. See, e.g., Houston Maritime Assn., Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (1967);
Cargo Handlers, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 321 (1966) ; Plumbers, Local 675, 161 N.L.R.B.
1351 (1966).
67. 317 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1963).
68. Id. at 749.
69. Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 53 (1954).,
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of an employee because he was hired ahead of other men to
whom the union had assigned preference....

"These authorities establish the principle that a union
does not violate Section 8(b) (2) unless the discrimination
which the union seeks would constitute a violation of Section 8 (a) (3) if the employer acted without union suggestion

or compulsion ....

70

The court thus implied that only if the employer's actions would
violate Section 8(a) (3) when they were performed independently of "union suggestion or compulsion" could they violate
Section 8(a) (3) if performed upon "union suggestion or compulsion."
Thereby, the court in Local 294 eliminated the fact that the
employer's treatment of employees would be carried out at union
behest from consideration on the issue of whether the employer's conduct "if committed, would violate § 8(a) (3)." But
this factor of "union suggestion or compulsion" cannot be eliminated from consideration. The fact that employer treatment
of employees is induced by a union changes the nature of the
employer's action for purposes of Section 8(a) (3).
The Campbell case, one of the cases on which the court of
appeals relied as a basis for its stated "principle," and the
Radio Officers' case illustrate the significance of union inducement of employer action. " In Aeronautical etc. v. Campbell, 347
U.S. 521 (1949), the Court gave its approval to super-seniority
for union officials which was, of course a practice proposed by
the union." Instead of supporting the view that union-induced
employer action can only be a violation of 8(a) (3) when the
same employer action performed independently would be a violataion of Section 8(a) (3), the Campbell case actually opposes
that view. It is clear that an employer's grant of super-seniority
to union officials because of their union position independent
of any union :request would be violative of Section 8(a) (3) as
"discrimination" that "encourages membership in a labor organization, ' 71 yet the same employer action when induced by a
union was approved by the Supreme Court. Thus, the fact that
an employer's action in giving union officials super-seniority is
70. 317 F.2d 746, 748-49 (2d Cir. 1963).
71. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).

1968]

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

69

union induced prevents the employer's action from violating Section 8(a) (3).
In the Radio Officers' case, union dissatisfaction with the
manner in which an employee secured a job on a ship (because
it entailed "bumping" another employee off the job) caused the
72
union to induce the employer to refuse to hire the employee.
It is clear that if, for the same reason, the employer had refused
to hire the employee independently of union inducement, its
action would not have been in violation of Section 8 (a) (3). Yet,
the fact that the employer's refusal to hire the employee was
union induced sufficed to make that conduct a violation of Section 8(a) (3).73
It is clear, therefore, that, if employer treatment of employees is union induced, that is a relevant fact in determining
whether the employer's treatment of employees violated Section
8(a) (3). As has been shown, whenever employer treatment of
employees is union induced, the employer's action constitute "discrimination" for the purposes of Section 8 (a) (3) because they
are caused by employee exercise of the Section 7 right to be a
good, bad, or indifferent union member.
That employer treatment of employees taken at union behest
always constitutes "discrimination" for the purposes of Section
8(a) (3) does not, however, imply that all such employer treatment is violative of Section 8(a) (3). In order to find that Section 8(a) (3) has been violated, not only "discrimination" but
also the second element of a violation, encouragement or discouragement of membership in a labor organization, must be
found. Not all employer actions that are "discrimination" encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization for
the purposes of Section 8(a) (3). When they do not, the employer actions do not constitute an unfair labor practice under
that section. This, as we shall see in the succeeding article, is
the basis upon which the union-induced employer actions in the
Teamsters, Local 357 case14 and the other cases mentioned by
72. See 347 U.S. 17, 30 (1954).
73. See Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 52-54 (1954)
Teamsters, Local 676, 172 N.L.R.B. 58 (1968).
74. 365 U.S. 667 (1961). This analysis of union-induced employer treatment
of employees would require a finding of "discrimination" in the Teamsters,
Local 857 case, which is contrary to the views of the majority expressed in the
opinions of Justice Douglas and Harlan. See pages 51-52 supria. The holding
of the case, that a union induced discharge of an employee for failure to use a
union operated hiring hall is not violative of either § 8(a) (3) or § 8(b) (2),
would then be based on the nonexistence of encouragement or discouragement of

union membership for the purposes of § 8(a) (3). This alternative is hinted at in
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the court of appeals in the Local 294 case fall outside the prohibition of Section 8(a) (3) .75
Thus, the Board majority's decision in the Miranda Fuel
case and the cases following it do not stand for the proposition
that discrimination within Section 8(a) (3) can occur when employer treatment of employees is based on something other than
employee exercise of Section 7 rights. As we have seen, in all of
these cases, the cause of the employer treatment of employees
was employee exercise of Section 7 rights. These cases, like the
great bulk of those involving employer treatment of employees
independent of union request, also hold that "discrimination"
for the purposes of Section 8 (a) (3) requires that an employer's
treatment of his employees be caused by employee exercise of
Section 7 rights.
We have concluded that, in order to find that "discrimination" for the purposes of Section 8(a) (3) occurred, it must be
found that the employer treatment of its employees was caused
by employee exercise of Section 7 rights. 6 But we are still faced
with resolving whether "discrimination" requires that the employer treatment of employees be differential. The view that
differential employer treatment of employees is required has
been expressed by the Board, courts, and commentators.2
There are two possible forms of differential employer treatment of employees caused by employee exercise of Section 7
rights. The differential employer treatment may be either adverse or favorable treatment of the employees involved in the
exercise of Section 7 rights as compared with (1) the treatthe opinions of Justices Douglas and Harlan (see 365 U.S. 667, 675-76, 679-80,
684 (1961), and it has been accepted by the Board as the rationale of the case.
See note 75 infra; Hod Carriers, Local 7, 135 N.L.R.B. 865, 866 (1962). See also
NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 185 (2d Cir. 1963) (dissenting
opinion).
75. See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 187-88 (1962) : "As we read
Local 357, the Supreme Court did not overrule its holding in Radio Officers that
union membership is encouraged or discouraged whenever a union causes an
employer to affect an individual's employment status. What it does hold, in our
opinion, is that an 8(a) (3) or 8(b) (2) violation does not necessarily flow
from the conduct which has the foreseeable result of encouraging union membership, but that given such 'foreseeable result' the finding of a violation may
turn upon an evaluation of the disputed conduct 'in terms of legitimate employer
or union purposes.' "
76. It is clear that "discrimination" may be found even though the actions
of the employer cannot be considered arbitrary. See e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793
(1945) ; contra, Judge Friendly dissenting in NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326
F.2d 172, 181 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Meltzer, The Lockout Cases, 1965 Sup. CT. REV.
87, 100.
77. See pages 50-51 supra.
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ment of other employees who are not involved in the exercise
of Section 7 rights, e.g., the discharge by the employer of employees engaged in union solicitation and the retention of all
other employees; or (2) what the treatment of the same employees would be because of their involvement in similar activities that are unrelated to the exercise of Section 7 rights,
e.g., the transfer of all employees to a less desirable employee
classification because they had joined a labor union, when employee affiliation with a fraternal or patriotic organization
would not have resulted in such a transfer.
Whether either of these forms of differential treatment is
necessary to support a finding of discrimination for the purposes of Section 8(a) (3) was never discussed in Congress. The
examples of discrimination discussed prior to the passage of
the Wagner Act involved employer differential treatment of
employees, e.g., discharging an employee who joins a labor organization and denying employment to employees and appli78
cants for employment who refuse to sign a yellow-dog contract.
Hence, the legislative history of Section 8(a) (3) provides no
guidance.
Nor was there any occasion for the Supreme Court to address
itself to this question in the first Wagner Act cases. In those
cases, the employer was charged with having visited adverse
treatment on employees because of their activities on behalf of
labor organizations, and the cause of the adverse treatment of
the employees was their exercise of Section 7 rights.7 9 The employers did not contend that they had not engaged in differential treatment of employees; that they treated all employees
in the same way or that they would have reacted in the same
way to employee activities on behalf of social organizations.
So it was not necessary to determine whether absent any differential treatment of employees an employer could be found
to have practiced "discrimination" for purposes of Section
8(a) (3).
At an early point in the administration of the Act, it was
established that 'although no difference is made in the treat78. See S. Rep. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934), 1 LEG. HIST.
1105; 79 CONG. REC. 7570 (1935), 2 LEG. HIST. 2335 (remarks of Senator
Wagner) ; 79 CONG. REC. 7658 (1935), 2 LEG. HIST. 2370 (remarks of Senator
Walsh).

79. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v.
Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937) ; NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103
(1937) ; Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
,
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ment of union members and non-union employees," "discrimination" could still be found.8 0 Thus, differential employer treatment
of the employees involved in the exercise of Section 7 rights as
compared with the treatment of other employees who are not
involved in the exercise of Section 7 rights is not a prerequisite
to a finding of Section 8 (a) (3) "discrimination." This rule has
been followed consistently in cases in which all employees in a
bargaining unit are treated adversely because of employee exercise of Section 7 rights and in other cases.8 1
But it remained unsettled whether it was necessary to a
finding of "discrimination" to have differential employer treatment of employees involved in the exercise of Section 7 rights
as compared with what the treatment of the same employees
would be because of their involvement in similar activities that
were unrelated to the exercise of Section 7 rights.
In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,8 2 this issue was
presented. The employees engaged in a lawful economic strike
during which the employer hired eleven replacements to whom
it promised permanent positions. After the strike, only five of
the eleven permanent replacements chose to retain their jobs
and the employer reinstated six strikers and denied reinstatement to five. In choosing which of the eleven strikers it would
reinstate, the employer used as the criterion the extent to which
they had engaged in Section 7 activities. Those least active in
support of the strike were reinstated in preference to the more
active. Two questions involving Section 8 (a) (3) were presented
by the facts: first, whether the use of the criterion adopted by
the employer in choosing which of the eleven strikers it would
reinstate to the six available jobs violated Section 8 (a) (3) ; and
second, whether the promise of permanent employment to the
replacements and the fulfillment of that promise to the detriment of striking employees violated Section 8 (a) (3).81
80. See Ward, "Discrimination" under the National Labor Relations Act,
48 YALE L.J. 1152, 1170-71 (1939).
81. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1947);
General Motors Corp., 59 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1944), enforced, 150 F.2d 201.
(3d Cir. 1945); Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 718 (1944) (employer treatment of an employee
who had previously enjoyed a sinecure in the same way as other employees
because of his exercise of Section 7 rights, held "discrimination" in violation of
section 8 (a) (3) ) ; see Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg.
Co., 380 U.S. 263, 271-72, 274 (1965) ; Ward, Discrimination under the National
Labor Relations Act, 48 YALE L. J. 1152, 1170-71 (1939).
82. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
83. Since the Mackay case was decided before the 1947 amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act, the opinion refers to Section 8(3) rather than
Section 8(a) (3).
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With respect to the first issue, the Court held that "discrimination in reinstating striking employees by keeping out
certain of them for the sole reason that they had been active in
the union" was prohibited by Section 8(a) (3).84 This aspect of
the case did not involve the question of whether differential
treatment was required before a violation of Section 8(a) (3)
could be found because the Court accepted the Board's finding
that the employer had treated the more active union supporters
different from the other strikers.8 5
On the second issue, the Court held that an employer does
not violate Section 8(a) (3) when it promises replacements for
economic strikers permanent employment and abides by its
promise to the detriment of the strikers. It is not correct to conclude from the provisions of the Act, said the Court that
"an employer guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has
lost the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to
discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the
election of the latter to resume their employment in order
to create places for them. The assurance by respondent to
those who accepted employment during the strike that if they
so desired their places might be permanent was not an unfair labor practice nor was it such to reinstate only so many
of the strikers as there were vacant places to be filled....
While the holding of Mackay on this issue is clear, the rationale supporting the holding is not set forth in Mr. Justice
Roberts' opinion. The holding is that after an economic strike,
when strikers, who "retained under the Act, the status of employees" ' 7 and replacements, who are also employees, are competing for a number of jobs that is smaller than the then total
number of available employees (strikers plus replacements), the
employer may give the jobs to those employees who did not join
the strike.
There are two possible bases for the holding in Mackay. One
84. 304 U.S. 333, 346 (1938).
85. Id. at 346-47.
86. Id. at 345-46.
87. Id. at 346.
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is that there was no "discrimination" for the purposes of Section 8(a) (3), when the employer promised the replacements
permanent employment and then fulfilled its promise after the
strike. It could be reasoned that there was no "discrimination"
because there was no differential employer treatment of the
employees by reason of their exercise of their Section 7 right to
strike. The employer would have treated any employee who left
work without permission in the same way, i.e., by hiring a permanent replacement for him, whatever the employee's reason
for stopping work may have been: to go fishing, to take an
unauthorized vacation, or to strike. 8
The second is that, although there was "discrimination," no
unfair labor practice was committed because the employer did
not "encourage or discourage membership in a labor union" in
violation of Section 8(a) (3).
Since the Court did not set forth the basis for its holding in
Mackay, it evoked the possibility that the case established that
"discrimination" for purposes of Section 8(a) ((3) required
differential employer treatment of employees because of employee involvement in Section 7 activities, as compared with
what treatment of the same employees would have been because
of their involvement in similar activities unrelated to Section 7.
Thus, prior to the Court's decision in Republic Aviation,89
it was clear that, when an employer treated its employees differentially because of employee exercise of Section 7 rights, it
engaged in discrimination within Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
And, the Mackay case provided some support for the view that
such differential treatment was a necessary element of Section
8(a) (3) discrimination. Republic Aviation, however, indicated
that this was a misreading of the Mackay case. In Republic Aviation, the Court held that differential employer treatment of
employees is not a prerequisite to a finding of Section 8 (a) (3)
"discrimination." The Court there dealt specifically with the
issue whether "discrimination" requires that an employer differentiate in its treatment of employees on the basis of their
exercise of Section 7 rights as compared with what the treatment of the employees would have been for identical activities
unrelated to the exercise of Section 7 rights.
88. Of. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74, 84-85 (9th
Cir. 1960).
89. 324 U.S. 793 (1945). Since this case was decided before the 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, the opinion refers to Section 8(3)
rather than Section 8(a) (3).
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In its statements of the facts, the Court accepted that the
employer's act of discharging an employee for union solicitation
on plant premises did not involve any singling out of union activity for adverse consequences.
"In the Republic Aviation Corporation case, the employer
...adopted, well before any union activity at the plant, a
general rule against soliciting which read as follows:
"'Soliciting of any type cannot be permitted in the factory or offices.'
"... An employee persisted after being warned of the
rule in soliciting union membership in the plant by passing
out application cards to employees on his own time during
lunch periods. The employee was discharged for infraction
of the rule, and, as the National Labor Relations Board
found, without discrimination
on the part of the employer
°
toward union activity.9

Moreover, the Court set forth and rejected the employer's argument that "discrimination" required differential employer treatment of employees because of Section 7 activities.
"In the Republic Aviation case, petitioner urges that irrespective of the validity of the rule against solicitation, its
application in this instance did not violate section 8(3),
... because the rule was not discriminatorily applied against

union solicitation but was impartially enforced against all
solicitors. It seems clear, however, that if a rule against
solicitation is invalid as to union solicitation on the employer's premises during the employees' own time, a discharge
because of violation of that rule discriminates with the
meaning of section 8(3) in that it discourages membership
in a labor organization." 91
Thus, Republic Aviation held that "discrimination" does not
require differential employer treatment of employees because
of employee exercise of Section 7 rights. All that is required to
support a finding of Section 8(a) (3) "discrimination" is employer treatment of employees affecting their employment conditions caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights. 2 And
90. Id. at 794-95 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 805.
92. Accord, Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate
Free Employee Choice, 32 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 735, 737 (1965) : "But it is clear
that the Court used discrimination to signify something other than a distinction
between employees. The only way in which it may properly be said that the
employer discriminated was in treating these employees differently from the
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Since Republic Aviation, the Court has made it clear that the
Mackay decision was not based on a finding of no "discrimination" but on a finding that discouragement of employees in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act does not occur when an
employer hires permanent replacements for economic strikers.9
Further, the established rule that an employer violates Section
8(a) (3) when it refuses to reinstate unfair labor practice
strikers also supports our conclusion that "discrimination" does
not require differential employer treatment of employees.94 An
employer's refusal to reinstate unfair labor practice strikers
does not cease to be "discrimination" because the employer would
refuse to reinstate any employee who absented himself from
work without excuse whatever the reason for the absence, an
unfair labor practice strike, an economic strike, or a fishing
trip.9 5
CONCLUSION

We have therefore arrived at the following conclusions about
the meaning of "discrimination" as used in Section 8 (a) (3) of
the Act to define an unfair labor practice. First, "discriminaway he would have treated them had they not engaged in union solicitation.
Discrimination as thus used includes any employer action taken in response to
union activity."
93. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967): "In some
situations, 'legitimate and substantial business justifications' for refusing to
reinstate employees who engaged in an economic strike have been recognized. One
is when the jobs which the strikers claim are occupied by workers hired as
permanent replacments during the strike in order to continue operations. NLRB
v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-346 (1938) ; NLRB v.
Plastilite Corp., 375 F.2d 343 (C.A. 8th Cir. 1967) ; Brown & Root, 132
NLRB 486 (1961) ......
The fact that Mr. Justice Roberts, the author of the Mackay opinion, was
the sole dissenter in the Republic Aviation case indicates that the unexpressed
basis for his opinion in the Mackay case may well have been that there was no
"discrimination."
One commentator explained the Mackay case on the ground that though an
employer's refusal to reinstate economic strikers "might substantially discourage
employees from exercising their right to strike in the future . . . [,] such discouragement without discrimination does not constitute a violation of § 8(a) (3),
and a finding of discrimination appears to be barred by the fact that the
employer was pursuing his legitimate interest in maintaining operations." See
Meltzer, The Lockout Cases, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 87, 91. This seems incorrect.
It is settled that an employer's refusal to reinstate unfair labor practice strikers
is an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (3). See, e.g., Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956). Therefore, an employer's refusal to
reinstate unfair labor practice strikers must be "discrimination." Insofar as
the issue of "discrimination" is concerned, there is no perceptible difference between an employer's refusal to reinstate unfair labor practice strikers and an
employer's refusal to reinstate economic strikers. Accordingly, since the employer's acts constitute "discrimination" for purposes of Section 8(a) (3) in the
one situation, they must also be "discrimination" in the other.
94. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956); NLRB v.
J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 245 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1957).
95. Of. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1962).
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tion" cannot be found unless the cause of the employer treat
ment of the employees is employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
The fact that an employer treated employees adversely for any
reason, good, bad, or indifferent, is not adequate proof of "discrimination." It must be proved that the cause of that treatment
was employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
Second, the employer treatment of its employees need not be
differential. All that is required is that the employer treatment
be caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights. If this is the
cause, the fact that the employer would treat employees who
engaged in identical or similar activities unrelated to Section 7
in exactly the same way or that he treats all employees in exactly the same way whether or not they were involved in the
exercise of Section 7 rights does not prevent a finding of Section
8(a) (3) discrimination.
Thus, the meaning of "discrimination" for purposes of Section 8 (a) (3) is employer treatment of employees affecting their
employment conditions caused by employee exercise of Section
7 rights.
In a succeeding article, we shall see that this definition of
"discrimination" enables us to clarify the significance, for purposes of determining whether certain employer actions violated
Section 8(a) (3), of both (1) employer motive in the sense of
the cause of the employer's actions, and (2) employer motive in
the sense of motive to encourage or discourage membership in
a labor organization, i.e., the employer's pro- or anti-union
animus.

